Stallman : "It is hard to write a simple definition of something as varied as hacking, but I think what these activities have in common is playfulness, cleverness, and exploration. Thus, hacking means exploring the limits of what is possible, in a spirit of playful cleverness. Activities that display playful cleverness have hack value."
Con Circuit Bending si indica l'arte di modificare in maniera creativa, attraverso semplici cortocircuiti, apparecchi elettronici a bassa tensione o strumenti elettronici alimentati a pile, come giocattoli (il più famoso tra questi è lo Speak & Spell della Texas Instruments, commercializzato in Italia come Grillo Parlante dalla Clementoni), tastiere, batterie elettroniche e effetti per chitarra, allo scopo di generare suoni inediti e curiosi, creare nuovi strumenti musicali e generici generatori di suono.
Generalmente il Circuit Bending viene associato alla musica elettronica sperimentale, al noise e a musicisti alla ricerca di nuovi suoni e di nuove strumentazioni "aleatorie". I suoni generati da tali apparecchiature sono, infatti, per lo più casuali, caotici o comunque non canonicamente collegabili all'idea di suono emesso da uno strumento musicale.
Articolo Punto Informatico
Instead of using the nail and file, you can clip the leads to two paperclips, washers, coins, aluminum pop-tabs, or loops of copper wire that you place inside the speaker cone. The cone jumps when contact is made, breaking the contact for a moment, then the metal bits fall against each other and the process starts all over—a mechanical oscillator and the beginning of what Bowers calls "The Victorian Synthesizer"
The Victorian Synthesizer
L'interferenza dei fili sul sensore ad ultrasuoni ha prodotto questa melodia impazzita di suoni, dovuta alla presenza dei fili e al mio corpo che si avvicinava e allontanava dal sensore;
I sensori ad ultrasuoni non forniscono direttamente la misura della distanza dell’oggetto più vicino, ma misurano il tempo impiegato da un segnale sonoro a raggiungere l’oggetto e ritornare al sensore. L’impulso ad ultrasuoni inviato dal HC-SR04 è di circa 40KHz il tempo viene misurato in microsecondi, la tensione di funzionamento è di 5V
Il sensore HC-SR04 dispone di 4 pin: Vcc (+5V), Trigger, Echo, GND. Si invia un impulso alto sul pin Trigger per almeno 10 microsecondi, a questo punto il sensore invierà il ping sonoro e aspetterà il ritorno delle onde riflesse, il sensore risponderà sul pin Echo con un impulso alto della durata corrispondente a quella di viaggio delle onde sonore, dopo 38 millisecondi si considera che non sia stato incontrato alcun ostacolo. Per sicurezza si aspettano in genere 50-60 millisec per far si che non vi siano interferenze con la misura successiva.
Progetto originale : link
Hardware
330Ω Resistor
470Ω Resistor
Solderless Breadboard
Ultrasonic Distance Sensor
3 x Male to Male Jumper Leads
4 x Male to Female Jumper Leads
Software
sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade -y
sudo pip3 install python-osc
Python :
from gpiozero import DistanceSensor
from time import sleep
from pythonosc import osc_message_builder
from pythonosc import udp_client
sensor = DistanceSensor(echo=17, trigger=4)
sender = udp_client.SimpleUDPClient('127.0.0.1', 4559)
while True:
pitch = round(sensor.distance * 100 + 30)
sender.send_message('/play_this', pitch)
sleep(0.1)
------
Sonic Pi :
live_loop :listen do
message = sync "/play_this"
note = message[:args][0]
play note
end
#include <IRremote.h>
#define POWER 0xE0E040BF
#define UNO 0xE0E0906F
#define TVKEY 0xE0E0D827
#define ZERO 0xE0E08877
#define CHPIU 0xE0E048B7
#define CHMENO 0xE0E008F7
#define SAMSUNG_BITS 32
IRsend irsend;
void setup()
{
pinMode (3, OUTPUT); //output as used in library
}
void loop() {
irsend.sendSAMSUNG(REPEAT, 32); // Some receivers seem to respond a lot faster when a repeat is sent before the actual command.
delay(35); //This delay is needed for optimal response.
irsend.sendSAMSUNG(ZERO, 32); // hex value, 32 bits
delayMicroseconds(50);
}
http://lirc.sourceforge.net/remotes/samsung/BN59-00940A
NFC Reader
NFC Tools
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.02081.pdf
Lack of security protection of communication. Most NFC communications do not include encryption mechanisms during its data exchange, it relies on the short range (i.e., less than 4 cm) to guarantee absence of eavesdropping attacks. However, the attacker can still place the device (i.e., NFC tag or NFC reader/writer) between client and NFC provider (i.e., NFC contactless point-of-sale) to trigger a specific attack such as eavesdrop, URL/URI spoofing. This vulnerability can also be exploited to jam the data exchange between two parties by sending out specific packet at the right timing, which can lead to a deny-of-service (DoS) attack toward the NFC- service provider.
URL/URI spoofing. The authors show that spoofing attacks can be performed to trick the user to see the false information as a valid one. In example, the attacker will design an exactly copy of a user’s trusted website with an almost equal URL so the user does not see the difference if she is not cautious. In addition, to uniform resource identifier (URI) and uniform/universal resource locater (URL) spoofing the research shows that phone call and text-message spoofing using the NFC protocol are also applicable. Furthermore, URI and URL spoofing are specially useful in combination with other attacks (i.e., cross-site request forgery).
Lack of authentication mechanism of NFC device. When the NFC reader reads information from another NFC-enabled device, there is not any authentication mechanisms available. Therefore, there is a potential risk of tag replacement and tag hiding (TRTH) attack. In the TRTH scenario, the NFC tags are overwritten by an attacker with malicious information or the physical tag is replace with another tag prepared by the attacker.
Automatic and non-user intervention URL/URI connection. The proposed attack takes advantage of the non-user inter- vention when the device detects another NFC device in its proximity. The malicious NFC provides an URL/URI to attack the user’s device, as the Android system does not request any user intervention, the device will automatically open the provided link by either other smartphone or NFC-tag. This situation opens security and privacy threads for the device’s owner. Once, the device opens the link, it can be attacked by fingerprinting mechanisms or share the user’s location for example (see more details in Section IV. The URI can also open application services such as contacts to automatically add malicious contacts without user permission request.
The attack can be achieved placing NFC-tags that unlocked Android devices will read in several locations: (1) public transport: in areas where the public transport uses NFC reader we can track user’s movement from one station to another, collect the user’s routine information (i.e., when the user goes to work and back home, where does he work); (2) coffee shop, poster at shopping mall : placing NFC-tags under coffee tables or in locations where users tend to leave the device unlocked, we can collect not only device’s information but also the geo-location as we know where the tag is located. For both situations, we can also collect the mentioned social network profiles or leverage more complex attacks in combination with other documented browser vulnerabilities.
